Multiplus - MPLU3

Olhando em retrospecto, é curioso o final do artigo:


O valor de mercado da ação já está no R$25,20, bem abaixo do pior cenário do analista.

Abraços

Sim, isso só mostra que não devemos considerar o que esses analisas falam. Quem foi na onda desse daí se deu mal.

Abraços

Alugaram minhas ações ontem, dia 11, pagando 15,8 % a.a.

Tem alguém com raiva da MPLU.

JP deu compra na SMLS3 hoje

Já devolveram...quem alugou tomou um ferro absurdo.

Tadeuc,

as minhas ainda estão alugadas!!!

Por mim, que fiquem com elas por alguns anos!!

Fazendo um comentário. Diferente do ramo de cartões, não creio que o aumento da concorrência seja tão simples. Visto que a maioria dos participantes está atrelado a passagens, o que portanto depende da associação com uma empresa aérea. Nesse sentido, apesar de muitos verem como desvantagem, acho que o fato da latam deter 75% das ações da empresa uma vantagem. A controladora tem menos a ganhar ao prejudicar seus acionistas. Em relação ao contrato, se não me engano tem 14 anos para seu vencimento, o que reduz o risco WIZ. Por fim, em relação ao risco controlador, ao menos aqui a mesma é lucrativa, diferente do concorrentes. E se por acaso o pior acontecer, ainda sobra 20% dos pontos que vem de outras origens. Não é muito, mas melhor do que nada.

Recebi um relatório interessante de Sell Side.

vou tentar replicar aqui as partes que importam:

"We are making a significant structural change in our investment thesis for both Smiles and Multiplus: we are increasing the contract renewal risk associated with their respective parent airline companies. The impact of this change is more negative for Multiplus (as we assume the Multiplus-LATAM contract will not be renewed), leading to a sizable cut in target price. For Smiles, we adopted a 50% likelihood that the contract with Gol will be renewed, but regardless of this potential negative impact, we still rate the company’s stock a Buy due to its attractive valuation and given management’s solid track record in bringing valued-added ventures into the company—Smiles Argentina could be the next move."

Our preference: Smiles over Multiplus. We see Smiles trading at a 26% discount to Multiplus on a 2019E P/E basis, while our 2019E target P/E implies a fair premium of 111% (i.e., target P/E of 6.4x for Multiplus vs. 13.4x for Smiles). We see the current discount as unwarranted in light of Smiles’s stronger EPS growth momentum vs. Multiplus (eventually attracting investors seeking growth stories): we expect a three-year EPS CAGR for Smiles of 10%, compared with 6% for Multiplus.

 Multiplus: we now assume the contract with LATAM will not be renewed at the end of the current term in January 2025. Our YE2019 target price for Multiplus of R$16/share reflects the severe impact of this change (cut from R$42/share). One of the main reasons for our decision is that we see the amount of the tax inefficiency as too big to be ignored by LATAM—R$771 million (~4% of LFL market cap). Even if we assume that the contract will be renewed (in which case our YE2019 target price would be cut to R$35), upside is still limited, in our opinion, and we would not have a Buy rating.

 Smiles: we now assume a 50% likelihood that the contract will be renewed. Regardless of the deep impact on our valuation assuming a 50% likelihood of no renewal, we still rate the company a Buy in both base- and worst-case scenarios. Our YE2019 R$72/share target price for Smiles suggests 61% upside potential.

Why are we adopting different scenarios for Multiplus and Smiles? We understand that the decision to adopt different probabilities of contract renegotiation for these companies does cause valuation asymmetries, favoring Smiles. We detail the reasons in this report, but in summary we did it because (i) Multiplus has an earlier contract renewal date than Smiles—January 2025 versus December 2032; (ii) we perceive the financial situation of Multiplus’s parent company as stronger than Smiles’s parent company (according to past performance of both parent companies’ corporate bonds); and (iii) Multiplus had a change in parent ownership after the company was created (which added another loyalty program called Lanpass), so we do not see the parent alignment being as strong as in the case of Gol-Smiles.

Of course, no one has to agree with our decision to differentiate the contract renewal scenario between Smiles and Multiplus. Figure 2 shows what our YE2019 target price would be for both companies under the following scenarios: (i) base case: contract renewal likelihood of 0% for Multiplus and 50% for Smiles; (ii) worst case: no contract renewal for both; and (iii) best case: business as usual, both companies renewing their contracts with their parent companies ad aeternum.

Even considering a “no contract renewal” case for Smiles, we would still estimate 47% total upside potential and a Buy rating for the stock, which shows how depressed SMLS3 shares are currently.
Note that our previous valuation model (for YE2018 target prices) did consider such contract renewal risk, but to a much lesser extent. Previously we considered that both contracts would be renewed, but we reduced net margin by 5% for both Smiles and Multiplus by the time of the renewal. We believed it would be reasonable for Gol and LATAM to ask Smiles and Multiplus, respectively, to pay more for the airline tickets they buy. However, this scenario is now history, in our view.


TAX AX AX INEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY NEFFICIENCY IS TOO SUBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL UBSTANTIAL TO IGNOREGNOREGNOREGNOREGNORE
 Multiplus. We believe that the risk that LATAM will not renew its contract with Multiplus is very high, because of simple math: we estimate the potential benefits (aka ending the existing tax inefficiency) as too big to be ignored. We calculated the NPV of the tax inefficiency to be a non-negligible R$771 million (see Figure 6). This represents ~4% of LATAM’s market cap. Note that this is not a matter of strong or weak corporate governance standards between LATAM and Multiplus but of what LATAM board members are likely to decide with regard to the January 2025 contract renewal in order to maximize the value of the company. For us, the numbers do not lie.

Smiles. The same calculation for Smiles-GOL also shows a sizable number: the NPV of the tax inefficiency reached R$892 billion. This number is higher than the tax inefficiency at LATAM-Multiplus because of the higher net income we expect for Smiles vs. Multiplus, and does not take into consideration the fact that the contract renewal date is almost eight years later than that for LATAM-Multiplus.

The Air Canada-Aimia contract is set to expire in 2020. However, in May 2017 Air Canada announced that it will sever ties with the customer loyalty company and set up its own plan in 2020. Aimia’s share price immediately fell 63%, declining 82% in subsequent weeks as investors reacted to the loss of its key partner and the company offered few clues on how it would keep its five million customers from fleeing. Aimia stock currently trades at ~70% below its level before Air Canada announced its decision.
Air Canada’s share price, meanwhile, touched a 10-year high after it stated that bringing its loyalty program back in-house would boost the company’s financial performance while allowing it to offer customers better value. Whether Air Canada will actually launch its own program or is taking this position to negotiate better terms with Aimia remains to be seen; we will know by 2020. The stock today is still ~88% above its level before the decision was announced.

One can argue that Gol and LATAM would not pursue such a disruptive move (i.e., not renewing the contracts with their loyalty companies) because they have ownership in such companies: Gol has a 52.7% stake in Smiles, valued at R$2.9 billion, while LATAM’s 72.7% stake in Multiplus is valued at R$3.4 billion. If the parent companies do not renew the contracts with their loyalty companies, both loyalty companies’ stocks will be severely impacted, and the value Gol and LATAM have invested will also be affected.
In our view, however, this would not prevent these companies from taking such a step, as we see the value of their ownership in Smiles and Multiplus as an intangible asset, simply because if either parent airline decided to reduce its stake, both “parent-divestment risk” and “parent lower-alignment risk” would be triggered, with a negative impact on Smiles and Multiplus stock prices. Simply put, the business has a much lower value without the parents.

Grato por compartilhar.

O risco de fato existe ante a existência de dois programas simultâneos, porém, o que eles não levaram em conta é que a eliminação do programa de pontos brasileiro, apesar de vantajoso tributariamente, representaria um problema politico grande ao desagradar o regulador.

Em um mercado tão concentrado e regulado, não é uma estratégia inteligente enfrentar o dono da caneta.

Acho mais provável eles privilegiarem levemente o programa chileno do que propriamente encerrarem por completo o contrato com a Multiplus.

Em relação a Smiles achei interessante que em momento algum eles consideram o risco de quebra da Gol. O contrato entre as duas pode ser até 2032, mas quem garante que ela continuará existindo até lá?